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RECENT CASES
Adoption-Effect of Abandonment on Necessity of Natural
Parent's Consent-Welfare of Child-The parents of a three and one-
half year old child were separated. The mother retained the child, but
failed to properly fulfill her duties in caring for him. The father then took
the boy to the home of his parents. During the ensuing year and a half,
the mother visited the child only once or twice and contributed nothing to
his support except small gifts on holidays. Shortly after the father's death,
the grandparents petitioned for adoption. The mother, now remarried and
living in Michigan, refused to consent. The petitioners claimed that the
mother's conduct toward the child rendered her consent unnecessary. The
hearing judge found no abandonment, but was reversed by a majority of
the court en banc, which decreed adoption. The Supreme Court reversed
(Maxey, C. J., Drew and Linn, JJ., dissenting) holding: (i) In an adop-
tion proceeding, the findings of the hearing judge as to abandonment are
not reviewable if based on legally sufficient evidence; (2) A court may not
decree adoption on the basis of the child's welfare if no finding of aban-
donment has been made. In re Schwab's Adoption, 355 Pa. 534, 50 A.
2d 504 (1947).
Adoption is an institution of the law which is entirely statutory in
nature.' Among other requirements, nearly every adoption statute pro-
vides that the consent of living natural parents shall be necessary,2 but that
a finding that the parents have "abandoned" the child will render non-
consent ineffective.8 The law has always held in high regard the solidarity
of the family unit,4 and the careful inclusion bf these "consent" clauses
reflects the caution of the legislatures in creating a method for dissolving
blood ties. There can be no doubt, however, that the passage of adoption
laws stemmed from the realization that the state owed a duty to dependent
and neglected children who were not properly provided for by their
parents.5 Yet a number of courts, including the court in the instant case,
have insisted on calling the welfare of the child a secondary issue in adop-
tion cases, holding paramount the "natural rights" of the parents.6 These
tribunals have gone so far as to hold that the matter of the child's welfare
may not even be considered in the determination of whether there has been
i. See instant case at -, 5o A. 2d at 505; Ex parte Clark, 87 Cal. 638, 25 Pac. 967
(1891); Adoption Laws in the United States, 148 U. S. DEPr. OF LABOR I (1925).
. 2. See, e. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. I, § 2C (Purdon, Supp. 1946) ; IOWA CODE: § 6oo.3
(1946); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(542) (Moore 1943). Maryland is a notable ex-
ception; in that state, the consent of the parents is not required in any case. See MD.
CODE ANN., art. 16, §§ 74-8o (1939).
3. See, e. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. I, § 2c (Purdon Supp. 1946) ; N. Y. DomEsTic
RETr0ioNs LAW, § 111(3). Not all of the statutes use the word "abandoned," but they
embody similar notions. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 27-204 (1939) : ". • . wilfully deserted
and neglected to provide care and maintenance for the child . . ."; N. J. STATS.
ANN., tit. 9, §§ 3-4 (1939) : ". • . forsaken parental obligations."
4. See In re Norris. 157 Misc. 333. 283 N. Y. Sup. 513 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; In re
Bistany, 2o9 App. Div. 286, 2o4 N. Y. Supp. 599 (4th Dept. 1924).
5. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted' Child, 28 WASH. U.
L. 0. 221, 223; see Beech's Adoption, 7 Pa. D. & C. 505 (1926). See also Adoption
Laws in the United States, 148 U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR 4 (1925) ; Note, 22 COL. L. Rv.
332, 341 (1922).
6. E. g., In re Cohen's Adoption, I55 Misc. 2o2, 279 N. Y. Supp. 427 (Surr. Ct.
1935) ; Caruso v. Caruso, 175 Misc. 290, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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abandonment. 7 This is a somewhat unrealistic approach, since it renders
inarticulate the fundamental premise which ought to underlie every adop-
tion decision, namely the promotion of the welfare of the child.8 There is
no sound reason why a consideration of welfare ought to be confined strictly
to custody cases, as the majority here held.9 Courts do use the welfare
standard in determining whether the conduct of the parents has been suffi-
ciently reprehensible to warrant the taking of their parental rights 10 from
them temporarily. They should follow the same norm in cases in which
those rights may be taken away permanently and vested in persons who are
capable of discharging the correlative duty of care and protection.", Some
courts frankly admit the use of the welfare standard in an adoption pro-
ceedings.12  If the rule of the instant case were to be applied generally, a
child whose parents had once been shown to be unfit to rear him, might well
grow up with his loyalties divided between the persons who had raised
him and the parents who might regain his custody at any time by sufficiently
repentant conduct. The rule would not encourage foster parents, and
would certainly subvert the welfare of the child.' 8 One possible justifica-
tion for the result reached here lies in a particular provision of Pennsylva-
nia inheritance law, whereby an adopted child loses his right to inherit from
his natural parents.' 4 By refusing the adoption, the court has enabled
the child to retain the right to inherit from both his mother and his grand-
parents, which might be said to be promotive of his welfare. In the ab-
sence of special circumstances, however, this argument would scarcely
outweigh the undesirable features of the decision.
Bankruptcy-Possession of Concealed Assets by Officer of Bank-
rupt-Burden of Proof in Contempt Proceedings for Non-compliance
with Turnover Order-Appellant was the principal officer of a cor-
poration adjudicated bankrupt April 23, 1942. The Referee, on August 9,
1943, entered a turnover order against appellant for $17,5oo, based upon the
7. Davies' Adoption, 353 Pa. 579, 46 A. 2d 252 (946) ; In re Marino's Adoption,
I68 Misc. I58, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 328 (Surr. Ct 1938) ; Petition of Sulewski, 113 Pa. Super.
301, 173 Atl. 747 (934) ; In re Bistany, 209 App. Div. 286, 204 N. Y. Supp. 599 (4th
Dept. 1924) ; In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S. W. I097 (1917).
8. "The individual interests of parents which used to be the thing chiefly regarded
has come to be almost the last thing regarded as compared with the interest of society
and of the child." PooND, THE SPIRIT OF THE ComroN LAW (1p2i) i89. See also
Kuhlmann, supra note 5, at 223-224.
9. Instant case at -, 5o A. 2d at 507, 508.
1o. "The right of parents is not an absolute right of property, but is in the nature
of a trust reposed in them, and is subject to their correlative duty to care for and pro-
tect the child. . . ." Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 2oI, 8o N. E. 8o2, 805
(907). For an excellent historical analysis of the relative rights and duties of parent
and child, see discussion in Letchocek's Adoption, I Pa. D. & C. 223 (1921).
ii. Some courts do not hesitate to follow it. E. g., In re Jackson, 201 Wis. 642,
231 N. W. 158 (1930) ; Rizo v. Burruel, 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234 (1921) ; Thompson
v. Arnold, 208 Mo. App. 102, 230 S. W. 322 (192i) ; Viereck v. Sullivan 77 Wash.
313, 137 Pac. 456 (1914).
12. In re Potter, 85 Wash. 617, i49 Pac. 23 (I915). This progressive court
viewed the problem in its proper perspective when it said: ". . . in considering cases
of this kind. . . . we will make our first consideration the welfare of the child." Id.
at 620, 149 Pac. at 24.
13. "When, in pursuance, perhaps, of the abandonment, new ties have been formed,
and a new station in life has been taken by the child, it might be unjust that, solely
because of the parent's caprice, legal sanction should be refused to the new conditions."
Winans v. Luppie, 47 N. J. Eq. 302, 304, 2o AtI. 969, 970.
14. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 102 (Purdon, Supp. 1946). Only four other juris-
dictions have similar provisions; they are California, Connecticut, Louisiana, and the
District of Columbia. For an outstanding compendium of the various inheritance laws
regarding adopted children, see Kuhlmann, supra note 5, at 227-232.
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trustee's clear showing of a merchandise shortage in the bankrupt's books
for November and December 1941 and a presumption of continued posses-
sion which appellant denied but did not otherwise rebut. The turnover
order was affirmed.' On June 5, 1945, after hearings in which appellant
testified to his present financial and physical inability to comply, the District
Court committed him for contempt. On appeal the contempt order was
affirmed.2  The turnover proceedings are res judicata. Burden was on
appellant to show an inability to comply arising since the turnover order,
which he failed to do. In re Luvmw Camer Service, Inc., 157 F. 2d 951
(C. C. A. 2d 1946), cert. granted, 15 U. S. L. WEEK 3343 (March Io,
1947).
Although the court purported to follow settled law,3 the decision was
handed down with great reluctance, the opinion being devoted primarily to a
strong collateral attack upon the presumption of continued possession ap-
plied in the already adjudicated turnover proceedings.4 Issuance of a
turnover order in bankruptcy 5 necessarily presupposes an ability to com-
ply ;" but once the trustee has clearly traced the missing property to the
taker,7 the effect of applying the presumption is to put the burden on the
latter to show a loss of possession.8  Rebuttal of the presumption, how-
ever, involves an incriminating admission of the taking.9 Hence, in the
instant case the court thought the application of the presumption, which
it regarded as an "unreasonable fiction" not warranted by the facts, had the
effect of substituting a civil proceeding for what was in fact a criminal
prosecution without the requisites of trial by jury and proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt ;1o but indicated precedent had necessitated its application."
i. By the District Court, 57 F. Supp. 632 (S. D. N. Y. 1943), and the Circuit
Court without opinion, sb nor. Zeitz v. Maggio, 145 F. 2d 241 (C. C. A. 2d I944),
cert. denied, 324 U. S. 841 (1945).
2. Judge Frank delivered the opinion.
3. Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358 (1929) ; I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 245-246 (4th
ed. 1940) (as to burden of proof) ; 2 id. at 535-536 (as to turnover proceedings being
res judicata).
4. See supra note I.
5. Bankruptcy Courts are authorized to issue turnover orders by §§ 2(a) 7 and
2(a) I5 of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 843 (1938), II U. S. C. §§ II(a) 7, II(a) I5
(194o). Such authority can be delegated to Referees by § 38, 52 STAT. 857-858 (1938),
ii U. S. C. § 66 (1940). A turnover order is an exercise of the summary jurisdiction
granted by § 23, 52 STAT. 854 (938), II U. S. C. § 46 (194o). See also McGovern,
Aspects of the Turtover Proceeding in Bankruptcy, 9 FORD. L. REv. 313-315 (1940).
6. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 520-522.
7. The burden is on the trustee to establish the taking by "clear and convincing
evidence . . . the same kind of evidence required in a case of fraud in a court of
equity." Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 362 (1929).
8. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 524-525.
9. Concealing assets is made a criminal offense under § 29(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 52 STAT. 855-856 (1938), II U. S. C. § 52(b) (194o).
io. From a strictly conceptual point of view a turnover order is civil and its en-
forcement does not violate the basic constitutional right to trial by jury. Hirschfield
v. Bryant, 14 F. 2d 931 (C. C. A. 8th 1926) (turnover proceedings) ; Kattelman v.
Madden, 88 F 2d 858 (C. C. A. 8th 1937) (contempt proceedings).
ii. The Second Circuit applies the presumption with an almost conclusive effect.
Seligson v. Goldsmith, 128 F. 2d 977 (C. C. A. 2d 1942) (opinion by L. Hand, J._
presumption unjustified after 34 months but precedent forces its application). But
earlier decisions all but rejected it, Danish v. Sofranski, 93 F. 2d 424 (C. C. A. 2d
1937) (L. Hand, J.-burden on trustee where original taking is admitted), and then
applied it only to a limited degree, In re Pinsky-Lapin & Co., 98 F. 2d 776 (C. C. A. 2d
1938) (A. Hand, J.-strength of presumption depends on amount and nature of prop-
erty taken, time elapsed, and credibility of any explanation). The Fourth and Eighth
Circuits apply the presumption but limit it by the circumstances. Brune v. Fraidin, 149
F. 2d 325 (C. C. A. 4th 1945) (presumption disappeared after almost 3 years) ; Marin
v. Ellis, 15 F. 2d 321 (C. C. A. 8th 1926) (presumption weakens with time).
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Inasmuch as the court had already affirmed without opinion the turnover
proceedings this attack might seem merely an afterthought. But the re-
sult, perhaps uncalculated, is to attack also the rule for the subsequent
contempt proceedings, laid down by the Supreme Court in the Oriel
case,1 2 and assertedly followed here, which in effect applies the same pre-
sumption 1 8 b , placing the burden on the bankrupt to "show a change in
situation after the turnover order relieving him from compliance." 14 The
presumption is usually justified on the grounds that, logically, the bank-
rupt has the peculiar knowledge of the facts and, practically, there is no
other efficient way to recover missing property for the benefit of the
creditors.1 5 Use of the presumption, however, should be tempered with
judicial discretion.16  Essentially it is a presumption of fact,'17 no stronger
than the circumstances warrant,'- and hence it becomes an "unreasonable
fiction" only when applied in contradiction of the facts. Since the circum-
stances in the instant case apparently warranted the court's expressed con-
viction that appellant was no longer able to comply with the turnover
order,'9 the difficulty of the court was not that the presumption had to be
applied because of precedent, but that it must be applied conclusively in de-
fiance of the facts. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court should approve
this interpretation of its rule in the Oriel case.
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit-Effect of Foreign
Judgment on Insolvency Proceedings-In 1934 claimant started a tort
action in a Missouri court against an unincorporated Illinois insurance
company doing business in Missouri. In 1938 a statutory liquidator was
appointed in Illinois, and the' Illinois court issued an order staying all suits
against the company.' The Missouri court was duly notified and the liqui-
dator did not continue defense of the suit there, but claimant nevertheless
12. Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358 (1929).
13. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 246; concurring opinion of A. Hand, J., in Robbin
v. Gottbetter, 134 F. 2d 843, 844-845 (C. C. A. 2d 1943). But L. Hand, J. and Frank,
J. point out the Supreme Court has never specifically passed on the presumption for
turnover proceedings. Id. at 844 (L. Hand, J.) ; instant case at 954 (Frank, J.). The
Oriel case has also been cited as authority for applying the presumption in proceedings
for release after comn'tment for contempt. In re Roxy Liquor Corp., 107 F. 2d 533,
535 (C. C. A. 7th 1939) (release denied because presumption applied even after 54 days
imprisonment).
14. Oriel v. Russell, supra note 12, at 364.
i5. McGovern, supra note 5, at 332-342 passim. See also concurring opinion of A.
Hand, J. in Robbin v. Gottbetter, 134 F. 2d 843, 844-845 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) ; In. re
Rosser, ioi Fed. 562, 565 (C. C. A. 8th i9oo). Contrast the opinion of L. hand, J. in
Seligson v. Goldsmith, 128 F. 2d 977 (C. C. A. 2d I942). In California, the admin-
istrator of the bankrupt's estate has been allowed to obtain a judgment in the state
courts, setting up the turnover order which has not been complied with as res judicata.
Sampsell v. Gittelman, 55 Cal. App. 2d 208, 130 P. 2d 486 (1942).
i6. Brune v. Fraidin, 149 F. 2d 325 (C. C. A. 4th 1945) (power to commit for con-
tempt should be exercised carefully) ; In re Nevin, 278 Fed. 6oi (C. C. A. 6th 1922)
(bankrupt committed should not be confined indefinitely).
17. 2 WIGMORPE, EVIDENCE § 382 (3d ed. 1940) ; 9 id. § 2530; McGovern, supra note
5, at 333.
IS. In re Pinsky-Lapin & Co., 98 F. 2d 776 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) ; Brune v. Fraidin,
149 F. 2d 325 (C. C. A. 4th 1945) ; Marin v. Ellis, I5 F. 2d 321 (C. C. A. 8th 1926) ;
2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 524-525 (turnover proceedings) ; I id. at 246-247 (contempt
proceedings).
19. Instant case at 955, .
I. This procedure was authorized by §§ 188-209 of the Illinois Insurance Code.
SMITH-HuD ANN. STAT. c. 73, H" 800-21 (1940).
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secured a judgment against the company. He then filed the judgment as
proof of his claim in the Illinois proceedings, there being no assets in Mis-
souri. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed an order disallowing his
claim.2 Claimant appealed, and the United States Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that Illinois is required by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause 3 to treat the judgment as establishing conclusively the merits of
the claim. Morris v. Jones, 67 Sup. Ct. 451 (947).
The value of the Illinois procedure for liquidating insolvent insur-
ance companies lies in the fact that it requires all creditors to prove their
claims under the same circumstances. Whether this decision will seri-
ously limit the effectiveness of that procedure depends on whether the liqui-
dator could have successfully appealed from the Missouri judgment on the
basis of the faith and credit due the earlier Illinois decree. 4 The Court
left open this question, finding that the failure to appeal had rendered it
res judicatca in the instant case. 5 Assuming, however, that the liquidator
will not thus be able to funnel all claims through a single proceeding, was
the Court justified in so hampering this function of the state? 6 The Mis-
souri judgment could not have effected directly the order of distribution
of Illinois assets.7  Why then should Illinois be burdened by a conclusive
adjudication of the merits of this claim, when that adjudication may have
as detrimental an effect as a lien on the other claimants. s The tendency
of the Court has for some time been to reject the contention that a strong
state interest or policy justifies a state in disregarding the judgment 9 of a
sister state.10  There is a sound basis for this reluctance-the danger that
approving the argument might lead to a onsiderable development of state
"interests", forcing the Court to overrule state court interpretations of
state interest or else permit emasculation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. On the other hand, in deciding whether particular judgments
fell within the crystallized "exceptions" ' to the Clause, the Court has
undoubtedly been influenced by the nature and extent of conflicting state
2. People ex rel. Jones v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 Ill. 492, 63 N. E. 2d 479 (1945),
46 COL. L. Rxv. 5o (1946).
3. U. S. CosT. ART. IV, § i; REv. STAT. § 905 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 687 (1940).
4. See 2 BE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1400 (1935) and the conflicting lower
court decisions collected there in note 4.
5. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 77 (939).
6. The Bankruptcy Act does not apply to insurance companies. 3o STAT. 547
(x898), II U. S. C. § 22 (1940). This decision, therefore, makes impossible as com-
pletely unified an administration of their assets as is achieved under the Bankruptcy
Act for businesses which need it less. See In re Paramount Publix Corp., 85 F. 2d 42,
43 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
7. Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935).
8. The Court found that exclusive control over proof of claims was not necessary
for the protection of the Illinois court's "exclusive jurisdiction" over the property, p.
455. If there is any policy basis for this jurisdiction, however, it would seem to be
that the states require it to perform most effectively various useful functions with re-
spect to the property. In the instant case the function of protecting creditors is ham-
pered by a foreign adjudication as to the validi y of a claim as well as to priority of a
claim.
9. Local policy is treated more tenderly when the statute of another state is in
conflict with it. This difference may be due to the more specific language used by
Congress in stating the effect to be given to the judicial proceedings of another state.
REv. STAT. § 905 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 687 (1940). See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 437 (143).
io. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 2io U. S. 320 (igo8) ; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449
(1928) ; Yarborough v. Yarborough, 29o U. S. 202 (1933" ; Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943);
GoomcH, CoNx icr OF LAWS § 207 (2d ed. 1938).
ii. For the basic exceptions see GOODRICH, CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 205-6, 208-9, 211
(2d ed. 1938).
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interests. 12 If the majority had been as convinced as the minority '3 of
the importance of the interest of Illinois in the instant case, the Court
might have found that the company had "ceased to exist" before the Mis-
souri judgment was inflicted on it and that the judgment was therefore
of no effect. 14 Perhaps the most satisfactory solution to the difficulties
that arise when the general necessity for mutual court recognition conflicts
with the ability of any court to function as well as possible in a partic-
ular situation, is the adoption of uniform state laws. At any rate, adoption
by both states of the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act would have
avoided the problem in the instant case.15
Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law-Right to Appoint-
ment of Counsel-Petitioner, an eighteen-year old indigent, charged
with breaking and entering, a non-capital offense, was tried by a jury,
found guilty, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment by a Florida court.
Petitioner had been unable to employ a lawyer and the court denied his
request for appointment of counsel. In a habeas corpus proceeding in
federal district court the judgment of conviction was ordered vacated. The
Circuit Court reversed, holding that failure to appoint counsel for an indi-
gent defendant, charged with a non-capital offense in a state court, is not a
denial of due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Maya v. Wade, 158 F. 2d 614 (C. C. A. 5th 1946).
Conflicting decisions of the federal circuit courts,' each purportedly
defining the extent of the duty of state courts to appoint counsel for indi-
gent defendants, resulted in a maze of confusion which was thought to
have been dissipated finally by the case of Betts v. Brady.2  In that case,
virtually indistinguishable on its operative facts from the instant case, the
Supreme Court held that where the crime charged is non-capital it is not
necessarily a denial of due process for a state court to refuse to appoint
counsel, although requested by the defendant to do so. Thus, the Betts
case was taken out of the rule of Po'vell v. Alabamca,' a capital case in
12. It is not likely, for example, that the strong urgings of state interest by the
dissenting justices in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942), were for-
gotten when they became the majority in deciding that the same judgment did not have
to be given full faith and credit because of an original lack of "jurisdiction." Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
13. Dissenting opinion, p. 455.
14. Pendleton v. Russell, i44 U. S. 640. That the existence or non-existence of
the company is for this purpose a question of law is shown by the different conclusions
of the majority and dissenting opinions on this point, PP. 455, 458. Furthermore, it
would seem to be a matter of Illinois law, since the company was subject primarily to
state regulation. The case might therefore have been sent back for a determination of
this point. See Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934).
15. 9 U. L. A. 417 (I939). The Act provides for ancillary proceedings outside
the home state, putting local and foreign claimants in equivalent positions without caus-
ing the latter any inconvenience. Illinois adopted the Act in 1941, SmITH-HuRD ANN.
STAT. c. 73, f 833.I-.13, but it applies only to reciprocal states.
I. For a picture of the state of confusion in which the federal courts found them-
selves, see Carey v. Brady, 125 F. 2d 253 (C. C. A. 4th ig42).
2. 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
3. 287 U. S. 45, 71 (1932) : . . in a capital case, where the defendant is unable
to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense . . . it is
the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a neces-
sary requisite of due process of law. . . " For a good discussion of the apparent
limitations of the Powell case, see Notes, 42 COL. L. REv. 271 (1942), [1943] Wis. L.
REv. 118. Prior to the decision in the Betts case, supra note 2, it was anticipated, at
least by one text writer, that the rule of the Powell case would be extended to include
cases involving non-capital offenses. See RorrscHAFFEM, HANDBOOK OF AmERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81i (1939).
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which a Constitutional right to appointment of counsel was first established.
Attempts to reconcile the two cases and apologies for their contrary results,
based on a distinction between capital and non-capital offenses, have been
severely criticized as drawing too arbitrary a line.4 Nevertheless, the
circuit court in the instant case felt obliged to follow Betts v. Brady,5 but
not without recognizing that "at first blush" certain decisions of the Supreme
Court in later cases 1 create the "impression" that the case has been over-
ruled.7 A further analysis of those decisions convinced the court that the
impression was only superficial and that the position of Betts v'. Brady
as precedent remained undisturbed." The accuracy of the circuit courts
analysis, however, is not beyond question. It is true that the "later cases"
of Williains v. Kaiser 9 and Tomkins v. Missouri,'0 which by dicta would
seem to extend the scope of the Betts case, involved capital crimes. They
both were cases, however, in which the defendant had pleaded guilty, usu-
ally deemed strong presumptive evidence of a waiver of any right to ap-
pointment of counsel. 1  In a case 12 involving a non-capital offense the
court said, by way of dictum, that a defendant has a right to appointment
of counsel, even though he makes no such request of the court, so long as
he cannot himself procure counsel and does not intelligently waive his
right. Perhaps, then, the court in the instant case was too readily con-
vinced that the Supreme Court has not altered the line drawn in Betts
v. Brady."8 It is at least safe to say that the confusion, once thought to
4. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black (concurred in by Douglas and
Murphy, JJ.) in Betts v. Brady, supra note 2; 9I U. OF PA. L. REV. 78, 79 (1942) ;
Note, [1943] Wis. L. REV. 118; 42 COL. L. REv. 1205 (1942); 16 So. CALIF. L. REv.
55 (1942). In absence of a relaxation of the rule of Betts v. Brady by the Supreme
Court, a greater number of voluntary defenders' associations and more state legislation
will be necessary to protect indigents charged with non-capital crimes. For a compila-
tion of the various state statutes and a summary of their provisions, see Betts v. Brady
at 470.
5. Instant case at 617.
6. E. g. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323
U. S. 485 (i945) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945).
7. Instant case at 617.
81 Ibid.
9. 323 U. S. 471 (1945) ; see 44 MicH. L. REV. 489 (1945).
1o. 323 U. S. 485 (1945).
ii. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 468 (1938) ; People v. Harris, 266 Mich. 317,
253 N. W. 312 (1934) (plea of guilty deemed a waiver per se) ; see also Note, 42 COL.
L. REv. 271, 277 (1942) ; Comment, 23 TEx. L. REv. 66, 76 (1944). The problem of"waiver by plea" was not raised either in the Betts case, supra note 2, or the instant
case, since the petitioners had pleaded not guilty.
12. Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, 788 (1945) (defendant not apprised of his right
to be represented by counsel) ; in De Meerleer v. People, 67 Sup. Ct. 596 (I947), a
fifteen-year-old judgment of conviction for first degree murder (a non-capital offense
in Michigan) was declared nugatory because, among other things, the defendant had
not been told of his right to employ counsel; accord, Swem v. People, i5 U. S. L.
WEEK 3367 (1947); cf. Canizio v. People, 327 U. S. 82 (1946), 46 COL. L. REv. 647.
For a discussion of the English common law on the right of a defendant charged with
felony to be heard through counsel, see 5 HoLIswoRTH1, HISTORY OF ENGLISHa LAW 142
(1924). For an excellent summary of the development of the American constitutional
and common law aspects of the same problem, see Betts v. Brady, supra note 2, at
465-471.
13. See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 763 (i945) (insufficient time to consult
with counsel appointed for defendant in a non-capital case) : "We have many times
repeated that . . . due process require(s) that a defendant on trial in a state court
upon a serious criminal charge and unable to defend himself shall have benefit of coun-
sel, compare Williams v. Kaiser, . . . Tomkins v. Missouri, . . . and Rice v. Olson
. . . with Betts v. Brady. . . ." (Italics supplied.) The court in the instant case
tenuously reconciles its decision with the dicta of Rice v. Olson, smpra note 12 and
White v. Ragen, supra, by pointing out that in both those cases the states involved had
statutes requiring appointment of counsel (see instant case at 617, note 5). But the
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have been dispelled, still plagues the trial courts. It is to be hoped that
the Supreme Court will re-examine the problem and expressly evaluate
and indicate the significance of Betts v. Brady. And it is further to be
hoped that in the re-examination the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment will be found to protect indigent defendants in state courts to
the same degree as the Sixth Amendment has been held to protect them
in federal courts.
14
Courts-Judgment-Dismissal by State Court Bar to Suit in
Federal Court-Mortgagee brought a diversity suit to recover a
deficiency judgment in a federal court of North Carolina. He was a citi-"
zen of Virginia where the foreclosed property was located and where the
mortgage had been made. Mortgagor pleaded in bar the dismissal of the
same action by the North Carolina Supreme Court on the ground that a
North Carolina statute1 precluded the courts of that state from assuming
jurisdiction of such suits. The circuit court affirmed the district court's
judgment for the mortgagee, but the Supreme Court reversed (three jus-
tices dissenting) .2 By failing to appeal the constitutional question raised
by the state court's decision, the mortgagee is barred in the federal courts of
North Carolina by res judicata. Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657
(1947).3
This singular combination of facts, producing a "hodgepodge of res
judicata and/or Erie doctrine," 4 finds the Court divided on the respective
application of the two theories. The majority, in applying the bar of res
judicata, reasons syllogistically that: (a) The state court's decision pre-
cluded further litigation on the action in the state courts; (b) In a diversity
suit a federal court is "in effect only another court of the state"; 5 (c)
Therefore further litigation of the action is precluded in the North Caro-
lina federal courts. A closely-reasoned dissent by Justice Rutledge 6 crit-
Supreme Court has held (Williams v. Kaiser, supra note 9, at 473) that ". . . the
right to counsel . . . is a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . .
and the existence or non-existence of a state statute is not relevant in determining
whether the Amendment has been violated; see also Powell v. Alabama, supra note 4.
14. Defendants charged with felony in federal court have a right that the court
shall appoint counsel, where they are unable themselves to procure an attorney, in non-
capital as well as capital cases (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938)). Rights,
however, which are specifically protected against federal invasion are not necessarily
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from state invasion, e. g. Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, iiO U. S. S16 (1884) (indictment by grand jury not required by due process
clause).
i. N. C. GE:N. STAT. § 45-36 (1943) : "In all sales of real property by mortgagees
to secure the balance of the purchase price of real property, the mortgagee ...
shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage . . . secured
by the same."
The North Carolina Court said in interpreting this statute in Bullington v. Angel,
22o N. C. 18, 2o, I6 S. E. 2d 411, 412 (1941) : "The statute operates upon the adjective
law of the state which pertains to the practice and procedure or legal machinery by
which the substantive law is made effective and not upon the substantive law itself.
It is a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the courts of this state."
2. Justices Reed and Rutledge wrote dissenting opinions, with Justice Jackson
concurring in both dissents without opinion.
3. The history of the case is as follows: Bullington v. Angel, 22o N. C. I8, 16
S. E. 2d 411 (1941) ; Bullington v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. N. C. 1944) ; Angel
v. Bullington, 15o F. 2d 679 (C. C. A. 4th 1945), cert. granted, 326 U. S. 713 (1945).
4. Justice Rutledge so characterized the majority opinion, instant case at 667.
5. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, io8 (1945). See note 15 infra.
6. Instant case at 667.
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icizes the application of res judicata and contends that the primary issue
here involved is the Erie doctrine.7 That the mortgagee is barred from fur-
ther litigation in the state courts seems beyond doubt. The state court's
decision was on the "merits" of the action 8 to the extent that it decided the
constitutional question of whether North Carolina could close its courts to
the suit,9 although it disclaimed any adjudication of this constitutional issue
and declared that the statute in question affected procedural rights only. A
state may refuse to enforce rights arising in another state if such rights are
barred by the procedural rather than the substantive laws of the forum."0
But it is settled that a state may not deny due process merely by labelling
as procedural what is in fact substantive," and since the true effect of the
state court's decision here was effectively to deny the mortgagee any rem-
edy in North Carolina, it was in fact a decision that the statute is substan-
tive and the judgrhent was therefore on the "merits" to that extent.1 2 The
essential issue of the case, however, still remains: Since a federal court's
jurisdiction is created by Congress,'- can a state statute restrict this juris-
diction? In David Lupton's Sons v. Auto Club of America,1 4 a similar
fact situation, the Supreme Court held that it could not. The Court here
7. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
8. The dogma is that unless a judgment is bn the "merits" it does not have the
effect of res judicata. "Judgments of nonsuit, of nolle prosequi, of discontinuance and
of dismissal generally, are exceptions to the general rule that when the pleadings, the
court, and: the parties are such as to permit a trial on the merits, the judgment will be
considered as final and conclusive of all matters which could have been so tried." 2
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 751 (5th ed. Tuttle, 1925). See also RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 49 (1942). But a court's judgment on the issue of its jurisdiction is not subject to
collateral attack. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938) ; American Surety Co. v. Bald-
win, 287 U. S. 156 (1932) ; American Life Ins. Co. v. Fischer, 117 F. 2d 811 (C. C. A.
8th 194i).
9. Respondent urged in the state court that the statute violated U. S. CoxsT. Art.
IV, §1i: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other State." Hlowever, even had mortgagee failed
to take advantage of his opportunity to raise the constitutional issue he could not do so
now in the federal courts. Joseph Riedel Glass Works v. Keegan, 43 F. Supp. 153 (D.
Me. 1942). And although the North Carolina court disclaimed any adjudication of
the constitutional question, it must necessarily have found the statute constitutional to
give it any effect at all. "It is not necessary to the conclusiveness of the former judg-
ment that the issue should have been taken on the precise point which it is proposed
to controvert in the collateral action. It is sufficient if that point was essential to the
former judgment." 2 FRmEMAN, op. cit. supra note 8, 1462. See Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 378 (1940) ; Moschzisker, Res
Judicata, 42 YALE L. J. 299 (1928).
io. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932). See also
GooaicuE, CowFLIcTs OF LAWS §§ 77, 78 (2d ed. 1938). For a discussion of this
"labelling" process see Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflicts of Laws,
42 YALE L. J. 333 (1933) ; cf. Ailes, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflicts of
Laws, 39 MIcn. L. REv. 392 (1941).
ii. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U. S. 230 (1934) ; Kenney v. Supreme
Lodge, 252 U. S. 408 (1920).
12. Though respondent would thus be barred from another North Carolina court
he would not be barred in another state. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U. S. 145 (1932) ; RFSTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 49, comment a (1942).
13. 36 STAT. I091 (1911) as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1940) : "The district
courts shall have jurisdiction as follows: First: Of all suits of a civil nature, at com-
mon law or in equity . . . when the matter in controversy exceeds . . . the sum
or value of three thousand dollars and . . . is between citizens of different states."
14. 225 U. S. 489 (1912). Accord, Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 139 F. 2d 624
(C. C. A. 8th 1944) ; Stevenson v. Grand Trunk Western R. R., 11o F. 2d 401 (C. C.
A. 7th 1940).
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distinguishes that case solely on the basis of its priority to the Erie case.
It says, moreover, that in diversity suits a federal court is "in effect only
another court of the state" quoting from Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,' 5 a
recent case in which the Court strongly affirmed the Erie doctrine. It is
thus evident, as the dissent indicates, that the majority could not escape the
all-pervading Erie rule by recourse to res judicata. Further, the applica-
tion of res judicata here might well fail to minimize litigation on the
action, 6 and therefore, Justice Rutledge contends, the rule is improperly
invoked. Whether or not res judicata does properly apply here, undeniably
the Court has reached a solution consistent with the rationale of the Erie
doctrine.' 7 But it is interesting to note that had the mortgagee gone to
the federal courts in the first instance, before a state court interpretation
of the statute, he might then have secured an unassailable judgment.' s
Criminal Law - Parties to Offenses - Principal in Statutory
Felony-A passenger in an automobile driven by another, was indicted
and convicted as a principal for the violation of a "hit-run" felony statute
which applied in its wording to the vehicle operator only.' There was evi-
dence that the passenger, after the accident occurred, refused to leave the
car and made the statement: "Let's get out of here," showing the driver
15. 326 U. S. 99. io8 (1945). In that case, the Court said that the statute of lim-
itations, though generally considered only a matter of remedy (i. e., procedural) is in
fact substantive in that it effectively determines the litigant's rights if it has run
against him. Being, then, substantive, the federal court must follow the state law; cf.
Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., ig6 U. S. 239 (1go5). The
Court has held that the federal courts must follow other laws also which are in form
procedural but in effect substantive. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943) (con-
tributory negligence) ; Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939) (burden of
proof).
16. If mortgagee had successfully appealed the state courts decision, or possibly
had he unsuccessfully done so, he would then have been enabled to do what he now
seeks to do. This paradox would arise in the following devious manner: (a) If the
respondent had successfully appealed he could then bring his action in either the state
or federal courts. Bucher v. Chesire R. R., 125 U. S. 555 (1888). (b) Were respond-
ent's' appeal denied, but on the ground that the state court's decision was only proce-
dural and therefore not binding on the federal courts, then, federal courts being free to
use their own procedure, he could get a hearing in the federal court though barred in
the state courts. In view of the Guaranty Trust case and others, it is unlikely that the
court would have analyzed the decision in that manner, however.
17. A typical summation of the basis of the Erie rule was made in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99. 1O9 (1945). "In essence, the intent of that decision was to
insure that in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because
of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of
a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."
18. In such case, the district court would have had authority for holding that the
North Carolina statute was designed only in contemplation of the rights of mortgagors
of North Carolina property. Such an interpretation was placed on a similar statute
of Oregon by the Oregon Supreme Court in McGirl v Brewer, 32 Ore. 422, 285 P. 2d
208 (1930). But see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stensland, 15 N. W. 2d
8 (1944) ; cf. Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 61g
(1912). It is not likely that the Supreme Court would disturb a federal court's inter-
pretation of a state statute in the absence of a state court interpretation.
. i. N. H. Rav. LAws, c. 118, § 19 (1942). "Any person operating a motor vehicle,
knowing that injury has been caused by him to a person or to property, shall forthwith
bring his vehicle to a stop, return to the scene of the accident, give, to any proper per-
son demanding the same, his name and address, the number of the driver's license, the
registration number of the motor vehicle, and the name and address of each occupant
thereof. " This statute was first enacted in i9ii: N. H. LAws, c. 133, §20
('9").
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a route by which it was hoped they could escape detection. On appeal
the conviction was affirmed. State v. Derosia, 50 A. 2d 231 (New Hamp-
shire, 1946).
The case is one of first impression in the state of New Hampshire.
Courts in other jursdictions have held a passenger criminally responsible
only when he is also the owner of the vehicle,2 or when the statute expressly
so provides.3 Courts have held passenger-owners for manslaughter when
they were present and allowed reckless or drunken driving ;4 they have also
held a carnival operator for manslaughter because he arranged a highway
race during which one of the spectators was killed.- In all these convic-
tions, however, the responsibility seems to stem from a breach of duty to
act on the part of the owner of the vehicle, whereas in the instant case it
would be difficult to attribute such a duty to a mere passenger who was not
the owner. Here the conviction was based not on failure to act,6 but on
affirmative conduct in inducing or encouraging the commission of the crime.
The defendant in the instant case clearly came within the definition of
a principal in the second degree to a felony; he was present when the
crime was committed, and aided and encouraged its commission. Whether
they be called principals in the second degree, or accessories at the fact,
the law seeks to punish those who are present when a crime is committed
and who aid or encourage the commission of the crime.8 This fundamental
principle of the criminal law applies to statutory felonies, except where the
legislative intent is otherwise, or where the crime is one which by its nature
cannot be committed by more than one person." The "hit-run" statute
has become common,1 ° and it is usually said that the legislative intent is to
give the injured party an opportunity to find out who has caused his injury,
and to make someone responsible for rendering aid.-- This intent can be
thwarted as well by a passenger who encourages running away from the
scene of the accident, as by the driver who leaves of his own accord. The
mere fact that the statute in question mentions only the driver of the
vehicle would not necessarily mean that there cannot be other parties to its
violation. Statutory creation of new felonies should be strictly scrutinized
2. Goodman v. State, 2o Ala. App. 392, 102 So. 486 (1924).
3. People v. Maggio, 9o Cal. App. 683, 266 Pac. 813 (1928). The statute was
so worded as to include persons "who have or assume control over such driver."
CALIF. PENAL CODE, tit. 9, c. 12, § 367c (Deering, 1931). -owever, this statute was
later amended, and the present statute does not mention any person other than the
driver. CALIF. VEH. CODE, Div. 9, c. 4, §§ 480, 482 (Deering, 1937).
4. Ex parte Liotard, 47 Nev. 16g, 217 Pac. 96o (1923).
5. Rose v. Gypsum City, 104 Kan. 412, 179 Pac. 348 (igig).
6. Failure to act does not make one a party to a crime unless there is some duty
to act. Rex v. Russell, [1933] VIcT. L. R. 59 (1932); People v. Chapman, 62 Mich.
280, 28 N. W. 896 (1886).
7. 1 HALE P. C. *438; 4 BL. COMM. *34; State ex rel. Dooley v. Coleman, 126
Fla. 203, 170 So. 722 (936) ; Hardy v. State, I8o Miss. 336, 177 So. 911 (1938) ;
Kinder v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 84o, gi S. W. 2d 530 (1936) ; Walrath v. State, 8
Neb. 8o (1878).
8. For a full discussion of the subject see Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89 U. OF PA.
L. Rmv. 581 (1941).
9. See U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 471, 6 L. Ed. 693, 702 (U. S. 1827) ; 14
Am. JuR., CRIMINAL LAw §83 (1938).
io. Typical felony statutes: ALA. CODE, tit. 36, §31 (1940); CALIF. VEH. CODE,
Div. 9, c. 4, § 482 (Deering, 1937). Examples of misdemeanor statutes: ILL. ANN.
STAT., c. 95%, § 56 (1935) ; N. J. STAT. ANN., tit. 39, §4 (1929) ; N. Y. VEH. & TRAF-
FiC LAWS § 70-5 (a) (1942) ; Wis. STAT. § 343.181 (1925). It is interesting to note
that all these statutes apply in their wording to the operator of the vehicle only.
II. p HuDDY. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW 185 (gth ed. 1931).
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by the courts, and decisions should be rendered according to the letter of
the law, but this interpretation does not necessarily apply where the offense
is morally wrong and contrary to common decency. The conclusion is
inescapable that the decision of the court in the instant case is eminently
justifiable.
Husband and Wife-Tenancy by the Entireties-U. S. Savings
Bonds-Husband, co-owner of U. S. Savings Bonds issued to "husband
or wife," ' redeemed them in accordance with Treasury Regulations, 2 and
purchased bonds registered in his name only. The wife's claim that a
tenancy by the entireties was created in the original bonds was dismissed.
The court ruled that Treasury Regulations supersede Pennsylvania law
relative to tenancies by the entireties. Ruben v. Ruben, 95 Pitt. L. J. 65
(Allegheny Co. Pa. 1947).
The doctrine of tenancy by the entireties in personal property is well
established in Pennsylvania,3 and has been regularly applied to joint bank
accounts 4 and securities r held by husband and wife during coverture.
Such tenancy is created whether property is held in the name of "husband
and wife," or in the name of "husband or wife," 6 although the latter desig-
nation carries with it certain attributes not common to the former. 7  In
several instances, a tenancy by the entireties has been declared to exist
in U. S. Savings Bonds registered in co-ownership form.8 The instant
I. 31 CODE FED. REGs. § 3154(2) (Supp. 1945) (Registration in Co-ownership
Form) : "In the names of two (but not more than two) persons in the alternative as co-
owners, for example: 'John A. Jones or Mrs. Ella S. Jones.'"
2. 31 CODE FED. REGS. § 3r545(a) (Supp. 1945) : "During the lives of both co-
owners the bond will be paid to either co-owner upon his separate request without re-
quiring the signature of the other co-owner; and upon payment of either co-owner the
other person shall cease to have any interest in the bond."
3. "A tenancy by entireties arises wherever an estate vests in two persons, they
being, when it so vests, husband and wife." Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 632, 27
Atl. 405, 407 (1893). "An estate by the entirety is a form of co-ownership in real and
personal property held by a husband and wife with right of survivorship. Its essential
characteristic is that each spouse is seized . . . of the whole or the entirety and not
of a share, moiety, or divisible part. It is well-established that an estate by the entirety
may only be destroyed or terminated by the joint acts of husband and wife, and not by
the act of one of them." Gallagher Estate, 352 Pa. 476. 478, 43 A. 2d 132, 133 (945).
See Wilson, Some Aspects of Estates by Entireties, 14 TExP. L. Q. 307 (1940) ; Com-
ment, 4 U. OF PITT. L. R:v. 184 (1938).
4. See, e. g., Use of U. S. Nat'l Bank v. Penrod, 354 Pa. 170, 47 A. 2d 133 (1946);
Gallagher Estate, 352 Pa. 476, 43 A. 2d 132 (1945) ; Madden v. Gosztoni S. & T. Co.,
331 Pa. 476, 200 Atl. 624 (1938). See Irwin, Creation of Concurrent Bank Accounts,
43 Dicx. L. REv. 153, 164 (1939).
5. Wilbur Trust Co. v. Knadler, 322 Pa. 17, 185 At. 319 (1936) ; Magee v. Mor-
ton B. & L. Ass'n, 103 Pa. Super. 331, 158 Atl. 647 (1g31) ; Shank v. Shank, 54 Dau-
phin Co. Rep. 255 (Pa. 1943) ; Rice's Estate, 88 Pitt. L. J. 309 (Pa. 1940).
6. Geist v. Robinson, 332 Pa. 44, I A. 2d 153 (1938) ; Wilbur Trust Co. v. Knad-
ler, 332 Pa. 17. 185 At. 319 (1936) ; Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346. 98 AtI. 966 (1916) ;
Klenke's Estate (No. i), 210 Pa. 572, 6o At. 166 (i9o5). But see Note, 73 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 88, 92 (1924).
7. "Where a deposit is payable to 'husband and wife', . . . the husband and wife
may withdraw the funds if they sign together. . . . When, on the other hand, an
account is made payable in its creation to either 'husband or wife', there is an immedi-
ate expression of authority, of agency to act for both . . . and the.husband or the
wife may, from that authority, withdraw the entire account, but the money thus with-
drawn is impressed with the entirety provision that it is the property of both?' Mad-
den v. Gosztoni S. & T. Co., 331 Pa. 476, 486-487, 489, 2oo At. 624, 63o, 631 (1938).
8. Halstrick v. Halstrick, 56 Pa. D. & C. 349 (1946) ; Moyer v. Moyer, 39 Luzerne
Leg. Reg. 223 (Pa. 1946); Fox v. Fox, 26 Washington Co. Rep. 173 (Pa. 1946);
Fiouc. REv. Apr. 1947, p. I; see In re Estate of Evans, 57 Pa. D. & C. 55, 6o (1945);
Commonwealth v. Long, 28 Westmoreland L. J. II, 13 (Pa. 1945).
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case is thus of considerable interest, as one seemingly in conflict with the
general tenor of judicial decision in Pennsylvania. It refuses effect to a
tenancy by the entireties upon the theory that Treasury Regulations have
the force of Federal Law and are thus determinative as to the rights of the
- parties. Further justification for the supremacy of Treasury Regulations
is found in the necessity for uniformity in the control and regulation of
these bonds; to give effect to state law would be to subject the bonds
,to forty-eight different interpretations.' This reasoning presumably rests
upon a long series of cases in which, under Treasury Regulations, the right
of the registered beneficiary or surviving co-owner to Savings Bonds has
been sustained over the claim of a deceased purchaser's estate, despite con-
flicting state law.10 To deny the proceeds of the bonds to the registered
beneficiary or surviving co-owner is to decrease their attractiveness as in-
vestments, and consequently to impair the Federal Government's power to
raise money in time of national emergency.'1 In the instant case, the ap-
plication of state law relative to tenancies by the entireties would not have
this effect. Such application does not nullify the interest of either party,
as in the beneficiary cases; rather it confirms the rights of both. Tenancies
by the entireties are unquestionably popular. Property thus held cannot
be reached by the creditors of either spouse, 12 and is exempt from state
inheritance tax.'8  In the absence, then, of the same considerations which
motivated the rule of the beneficiary and surviving co-owner cases, it seems
justifiable to say. that there is nothing in a tenancy by the entireties which
is inconsistent with Treasury Regulations.' 4 By either law, each spouse
has authority to redeem bonds held in co-ownership form. Under Penn-
9. Instant case at 68-69.
io. Cases and statutes to this effect are collected in a Note, 52 YALE L. J. 917
(1943), and the many ensuing cases have uniformly adhered to this view. For Penn-
sylvania cases in point, see United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 5o F. Supp.
73 (M. D. Pa. 1943) ; In re Estate of Evans, 57 Pa. D. & C. 55 (1945); Prifer's
Estate, 53 Pa. D. & C. 1o3 (1945) ; Haire's Estate, :28 Westmoreland L. 3. i (Pa.
1946). Contra: Haas Estate, 0. C. Phila. No. 12o, Apr. 2, 1945, cited in Fmuc. Ray.
July 1945, p. i. The few opposing decisions proceed upon the assumption that the
Treasury Regulations were designed merely for convenience in making payments, and
do not preclude a judicial determination of the rights of the parties to retain the pro-
ceeds of the bonds. See Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 57, 293 N. W. 841 (1940), reviewed,
In re Murray's Estate, 236 Iowa 807, 2o N. W. 2d 49 (1945) ; Deyo v. Adams, 178
Misc. 859, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92-
P. 2d 254 (1939).
ii. "Thofisands of these bonds have been purchased by small investors in reliance
upon the promise that they would be paid in accordance with their terms and in accord-
ance with the regulations under which they would be issued. If any state can now set
at naught the provisions contained in the bonds and can render nugatory the regula-
tions of the Treasury . . . countless holders of these bonds have been mocked. The
representations upon which the bonds were sold would amount only to a play on
words." In re Deyo's Estate, I8o.Misc. 32, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 379, 386-387 (Surr. Ct.
1943).
12. Use of U. S. Nat'l Bank v. Penrod. 354 Pa. 170, 47 A. 2d 133 (1946) ; Beihl
v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 Atl. 953 (1912) ; Meyer's Estate (No. 1), 232 Pa. 89, 81
Atl. 145 (1911). With respect to the rights of creditors, Treasury Regulations pro-
vide that "if a debtor, or bankrupt, or insolvent is not sole owner of the bond, payment
will be made only to the extent of his interest therein which must be determined by
the court or otherwise validly established." 31 CODE FED. REGs. § 315.13(c) (Supp.
1945).
13. Madden v. Gosztoni S. & T. Co., 331 Pa. 476, 2oo At1. 624 (1938); In re
Estate of Mary R. Vandergrift, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 Atl. 898 (1932). See also
Fimuc. REa. Aug. 1943, P. 4 and Fmuc. Ray. July 1945, P. 3 (where it is suggested
that Savings Bonds be held by the entireties in order to avoid the state inheritance
tax). Estates by the entireties, however, are subject to federal inheritance tax. United
States v. Tyler. 281 U. S. 497 (1930), 44 HARv. L. REv. 130, 79 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 233.
14. I-alstrick v. Halstrick, 56 Pa. D. & C. 349, 354 (1946). Cf. Note, 52 YALE
L. J. 917, 918 (1943).
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sylvania law, the proceeds thereof remain impressed with the "entirety
provision" and inure to the benefit of both. 15 Treasury Regulations provide
for a discharge of Government liability on payment to either co-owner,' 6
but stop short of determining the interest of either party as against the
other in such payment, 17 expressly providing for judicial determination of
such conflicting claims.18 It would seem, then, that an adjudication of a
tenancy by the entireties in Savings Bonds would be recognized, and that,
in the instant case, payment or reissue could be made accordingly.'9 In the
light of such synthesis, it seems unnecessary, as well as unwise, for Savings
Bonds to be given attributes wholly at variance with those accorded other
securities similarly held within the same jurisdiction.
Income Tax-Deductions-Constructive Payment of Salaries as
an Expense-Petitioner corporation reported on a cash basis. In
1942 it voted salaries to its principal officers which were credited uncondi-
tionally to the officer's accounts. The officers, on a cash basis, returned
the full amounts for taxation under the doctrine of constructive receipt,
although only partial salary withdrawals were made during the taxable
year. Petitioner deducted in its 1942 return the full anount of the sal-
aries as expenses "paid" under §§ 23 (a) and 43 of the Internal Revenue
Code.' The Commissioner disallowed the deduction for that portion of
the salaries not actually paid out within the year. The Commissioner's
decision was sustained, the court holding that a cash basis taxpayer is
entitled to deduct salaries only to the extent actually paid within the year.
Constructive payment is not a necessary corollary of constructive receipt.
Vander Poel, Francis & Company, Inc., 8 T. C.-, No. 5A, Docket No.
9119, Feb. 25, 1947-
The doctrine of constructive receipt of income is aimed at protecting
the revenue. 2  Its purpose extends beyond preventing fraud and evasion of
tax.8 Logic which deflects from this mark is generally ignored. 4 The
doctrine of constructive payment, on the other hand, has been applied with
15. "The use of the disjunctive (or), employed in the purchase of the bonds, ac-
companied by the right of either spouse . . . to present the bond for payment does
not alter the character of the estate." Halstrick v. Halstrick, 56 Pa. D. & C. 349, 352-
353 (1946). Cf. Geist v. Robinson, 332 Pa. 44,.46, i A. 2d 153, 155 (1938) ; Madden
v. Gosztoni S. & T. Co., 331 Pa. 476, 489, 200 Atl. 624, 631 (1938).
16. See note 2; supra.
17. Halstrick v. Halstrick, 56 Pa. D. & C. 349, 354 (1946). Cf. Gasner v. Pierce,
286 Pa. 529, 536, 134 Ati. 494, 496 (1926); Uzarski v. Union Nat'l Bank, 152 Pa.
Super. 433, 437, 33 A. 2d 459, 461 (1943).
IS. 31 CODE FED. REGS. § 315.13 (Supp. 1945).
ig. Such adjudication might also declare the estate at an end and divide its pro-
ceeds between the spouses. Under this reasoning, the husband's conduct is deemed an
offer to terminate the estate which is accepted by the wife when she brings suit. Moyer
v. Moyer, 39 Luzerne Leg. Reg. 223 (Pa. 1946) ; cf. Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49, 1
A. 2d 244 (1938) ; Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 At. 172 (1934).
I. INT. REv. CODE § 43, 26 STAT. § 43 (94o) provides: "The deductions
provided for . . . shall be taken for the taxable year in which 'paid or accrued' or
'paid or incurred', dependent upon-the method of accounting upon the basis of which
the net income is computed, .. .
2. Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355 (939) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S.
376 (1930) ; cf. Sanford Corp. v. Commissioner, io6 F. 2d 882 (C. C. A. 3d 1939).
3. Hendrick v. Commissioner, I54 F. 2d 9o (C. C. A. 2d 1946) ; Loose v. United
States, 74 F. 2d 147 (C. C. A. 8th 1934) ; Commissioner v. Bingham, 35 F. 2d 503 (C.
C. A. 6th 1929).
4. Moran v. Commissioner, 67 F. 2d 6oi (C. C. A. Ist 1933) ; cf. Adler v. Com-
missioner, 77 F. 2d 733 (C. C. A. 5th 1935) ; Spier v. United States, 9 F. Supp. io2o
(Ct. Cl. 1935).
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contrasting frugality. An insurance company on a cash basis is not enti-
tled to a deduction of interest, as constructively paid, on dividends made
available unconditionally to policyholders.5 A taxpayer on a cash basis
who gives a note covering a previous note with interest accrued is not enti-
tled to a deduction of the interest.6 Nor can he deduct salaries authorized
but unpaid. 7  It appears, with few exceptions,8 that the courts uniformly
require an actual disbursement to entitle a cash basis taxpayer to a deduc-
tion. The instant case augments this view. The court was not impressed
by the questionable logic that a constructive payment is the necessary corol-
lary of a constructive receipt. Bookkeeping may comprise such principles;
protecting the revenue does not. A dissenting opinion contends that deci-
sions construing §§ 24 (c)5 and 27 1o of the Code, 9pecial statutes having
a background of tax evasion and avoidance, may not be precedent for de-
termining whether constructive payment is within the term "paid" in
H9 23 (a) and 43, having general applicability to all taxpayers. This may
be conceded, but it does not follow that thereupon an opposite result is
necessary. It is conceivable that a small cash basis corporation with sub-
stantial identity between officers and shareholders could pre-judge income
to an extent where a constructively paid salary would reduce taxes with-
out depleting working capital. It is equally possible the corporation could
actually set aside the money and treat itas paid out. It was not unreason-
able for the court to extend to §23 (a) and 43 its persistent reluctance to
apply the doctrine of constructive payment to a cash basis taxpayer in ab-
sence of an actual outlay.1 ' Compelling equities would be necessary to
justify exceptions to the rule of the instant case. The funds are secured
from possible illegal juggling and, from the payee's standpoint, entangle-
ment in litigation in which his claim to the funds would be challenged. The
rule may be applied without inquiries concerning constructive receipt by
the payee upon which it would otherwise depend.12  The court has arrived
at a practical solution in the eminently practical matter of preserving the
revenue.
Labor-Unionization of Foremen-Collective Bargaining Rights
under the NLRA-Foremen of the Packard Co. of Detroit organized
as a unit of the Foreman's Association of America, an unaffiliated organiza-
tion which represents supervisory employees exclusively.' The National
Labor Relations Board, holding that foremen were employees under § 2 (3)
5. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 269 (1933).
6. Nina Cornelia Prime, 39 B. T. A. 487 (1939).
7. J. H. Matinus & Sons v. Commissioner, II6 F. 2d 732 (C. C. A. 9th 1.94o).
This case was assertel to be the basis for the majority decision. Instant case at -.
The dissent distinguished it on the basis that no "constructive receipt" was involved.
Instant case at -.
8. William S. Linderman, 28 B. T. A. H13 (1933).
9. INT. REV. CODE §24(c), 26 U. S. C. §24(c) (194o) (limitations on expenses
as deductions from gross income).
10. INT. REV. CODE §27, 26 U. S. C. §27 (1940) (corporation dividend paid
credit), Cox Motor Sales Co., 42 B. T. A. Ig (194o).
II. 2 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL I comE TA XATION i0.I8, p. 32 (1942).
12. The following have been considered pertinent factors: payor's promptness in
payment and credit extensions, Chester M. Curry, 3 B. T. A. 237 (1925); general
financial condition of payor, R. V. Board, 18 B. T. A. 65o (1930) ; payor's cash on
hand, Marian Otis Chandler, 16 B. T. A. 1248 (1929) ; availability of amounts credited
to payee, Paul E. Weiss, 7 B. T. A. 615 (1927).
i. The Foreman's Association of America was organized in Aug. 1941 by four
supervisors of Ford Motor Co. See Northrup, The Foreman-'s Association of America,
23 HARV. Bus. REV. 187 (1945).
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of the NLRA, 2 certified them as a unit appropriate for collective bargaining
purposes under § 9 (b). The Company refused to bargain with the union
and challenged the Board's subsequent cease and desist order.3 On certi-
orari to the Supreme Court, a judgment decreeing enforcement of the
order 4 was affirmed in a five to four decision. Foremen are entitled as a
class to rights of collective bargaining assured to employees by the Act.
Packard Motor Car Co. v. N. L. R. B., 67 Sup. Ct. 789 (1947).
• This decision is doubly interesting, since not only does it resolve
fundamentally inconsistent findings of the Board for the first time, but also,
in view of the current labor legislation trend in Congress,5 it illustrates the
diverging tendencies that may develop through administrative and judicial
bodies on the one hand and the legislature on the other, from simultaneous
socio-economic forces. Foremen, like ordinary employees, are privileged
to organize for collective bargaining purposes,6 and historically foreman-
unions have existed in some crafts ar d trades for many years.7 Originally
the Board brought them unreservedly within the coverage of the Act,8 but
in the Maryland Drydock case 9 it held that there could be no appropriate
unit of supervisory employees under § 9 (b) of the Act, thus in effect
excluding them from its collective bargaining provisions entirely. Subse-
quently, however, foremen were granted the protection against discrimina-
tory discharge of § 8 (I) and (3),10 and in the instant case, the Board,
reverting to its original holdings, found that foremen at the "traffic-cop"
level are employees within the meaning of the Act, and accordingly entitled
to all of its benefits.1  It has since proceeded to extend the Act to all levels
of the supervisory hierarchy 1 2 and irrespective of affiliation with a rank
2. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940). Under §2(3) of the Act "The
term 'employee' shall include any employee . . ." § 9(b) states "The Board shall
decide in each case whether . . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof."
3. Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 4 (1945), 64 N. L. R. B. 1212 (1945).
4. N. L. R. B. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 157 F. 2d 8o (C. C. A. 6th 1946),
5. See H. R. REP. No. 245, Soth Cong., ist Sess. (1947).
6. See N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 3o1 U. S. 1, 33 (,937).
7. A historical summary of foreman unionization appears in Union Meinbership
and Collective Bargaining by Foren;, 56 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1049 (943). For an
indication of the success of such unionization see Coos Bay Lumber Co., 62 N. L. R_ B.
93 (1945).
8. Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N. L. R. B. 96i, 44 N. L. R. B. 165 (1942) (or-
ganization in independent union) ; Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 874 (1942)
(affiliated union).
9. 49 N. L. R. B. 733 (943). This decision did not assert that supervisors were
not employees under §2(3) of the Act. At 740 the Board (which had undergone a
change in one of its members) stated that ". . . the benefits which supervisory em-
ployees might achieve through being certified as collective bargaining units would be
outweighed not only by the dangers inherent in the commingling of management and
employee functions, but also in its possible restrictive effect upon the organizational
freedom of rank and file employees." This decision was followed by a series of strikes
of supervisory employees. See ig LAB. R .REP. (Labor-Management) 268 (1947).
IO. Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N. L. R. B. 348 (1944).
i. The Board pointed out how the era of scientific management in industry has
reduced the foreman in many instances to the position of "traffic-cop" of industry. It
found without merit the contention that the foreman is at all times "acting in the inter-
est of an employer" under § 2 (2) of the Act and that employer-employee are mutually
exclusive categories. Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 4 (945). The Court
in the instant case upheld this view, in re-affirming that § 2(2) of the Act is intendea
to extend the doctrine of "respondeat superior" to unfair labor practices.
12. L. A. Young Spring and Wire Corp., 65 N. L. R. B. 298 (1946) ; The Colson
Corp., 67 N. L. R. B. 72 (1946) ; Hudson Motor Car Co., 67 N. L. R. B. 368 (1946)
(supervisors with power to fire but not to hire).
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and file union.'3 In sustaining the Board, the Court must have been
aware of the cogency of "the underlying economic facts" that it found con-
trolling in the Hearst case. 14  The lower courts generally had followed the
Board's recognition of the dual role of foremen in modern mass production
industry, and of the rapid evolution, accelerated by wartime conditions, that
had brought them to experience the same needs for collective bargaining
as ordinary employees.' 5 Yet, despite the sound policy grounds on which
the Court could have based its decision, it chose a narrow, legalistic ap-
proach, stressing the "plain provisions" of the Act. It is noteworthy that
both majority and dissent disavowed the policy basis of their rationaliza-
tions. In the absence of any indication of legislative consideration of these
problems during passage of the Act,'? the Court was justified in taking the
broad view of "employee" that it did, and leaving the determinaiton of ap-
propriate units of organization to the administrative discretion of the Board,
thus giving the Act the flexibility of adjustment to the fundamental prob-
lems it was intended to solve, and leaving to Congress the creation of any
exceptions or qualifications.' 7
Patents-Legality of Inclusion in License Agreement of Covenant
to Assign Improvement Patents-Licensor held patents for a machine
designed to make and fill transparent packages. He granted licensee an
exclusive license under these patents to make and vend the machine. The
agreement was to run for ten years, with an option in licensee to renew for
five-year periods throughout the life of any patents comprehended by the
agreement. Included in the agreement was a covenant by licensee to dis-
close any improvements he might make in the basic machine, licensor.to
have the option of obtaining patents thereon, licensee to have the use of
the new patents without increased payment of royalties. Licensee took
out several patents on improvements but refused to assign them to licensor.
Upon licensor's giving notice of termination of the agreement, licensee
brought suit for declaratory judgment and injunction, contending that the
assignment clause was illegal and unenforceable. The Second Circuit re-
13. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N. L. R. B. 386 (1946); California Pack-
ing Corp., 66 N. L. R. B. 1461 (z946).
14. N. L. R. B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. III (1944). At 129 the
Court said ". . . the broad language of the Act's definitions which in terms reject
conventional limitations 6n such conceptions as 'employee', 'employer' and 'labor dis-
pute', leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly . . . by un-
derlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established
legal classifications."
15. N. L. R. B. v. Skinner and Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F. 2d 667 (C. C. A.
8th 1940). For the foremen's attitude to their problems see Hearings before Commit-
tee on Military Affairs on H. R. 2239, H. R. z742, H. R. 1728 and H. R. 992, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 505, 5o6 (1943). Interesting examples of the employers' attitude are
the pamphlet issued by the Chrysler Corp., entitled "SALL THE RANK AND FIE Boss
THE PLANTS?" (1946), and Forenta's Unions, 9 AWANCED MANAGEMENT 110 (1944).
For informative general discussions see Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees
under the NLRA, 29 IowA L. Rxv. 297 (1944),; Comment, 55 YA.E L. J. 755 (1946);
Note, 59 HARv. L. REv. 6o6 (1946).
16. See Statutes and Congressional Reports Pertaining to the NLRB, pp. 68-138
(1945).
17. H. R. 3020 would amend the NLRA to exclude supervisors from the definiflon
of employee. See H. R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., Ist Sess. 13-17 (947). For the
Board's attitude to the proposed changes see NLRB testimony before the Senate Com-
mittee on Libor and Public Welfare, March io, 1947, i LAB. REL. REP. (Labor-Man-
agement) 267, 268 (1947).
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versed a judgment for licensor.1 On certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a
five-four decision, reversed, holding that "the inclusion in the license of the
condition requiring licensee to assign improvements is not per se illegal
and unenforceable." Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith
Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 6Io (1947).2
Licensee had argued that the illegality of the assignment clause had
been established by a line of cases forbidding conditions in patent licenses
requiring licensees to purchase unpatented materials from the patent
holder.3 The circuit court had read these cases as the enunciation of a policy
of prohibiting the conditioning of licenses upon licensees' purchase of
"other" goods of the patent holder, and found the instant case within such
prohibition.4  The majority of the Supreme Court rejected such reasoning,
since: (i) assignment of patents is authorized by statute,5 and use of
another patent as consideration is not forbidden by Congress; (2) policy of
cited cases was not operative in the instant case, since the licensor was not
seeking to enlarge the scope of his patent, but only to obtain another patent,
an additional monopoly sanctioned by law.
The narrow holding of the Supreme Court is indicative of the extreme
caution which must be applied in the solution of any patent problem. Two
competing policies must be balanced carefully: (i) the protection of the
patent monopoly; (2) the enforcement of the anti-trust statutes.6 With
the purpose of the patent statutes 7 the holding 9f the instant case does
not conflict. Licensee had received sufficient emolument for his inven-
tions,3 while the agreement apparently did not foreclose incentive 9 toward
i. Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., 156 F. :2d 198 (C. C.
A. 2d 1946), 59 HARv. L. REv. 996 (1946).
2. Rehearing denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 859 (1947). See 47 COL. L. Ray. 321 (1947).
3. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U. S. 68o (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944) ; Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1942) ; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
Development Corp., 283 U. S. 27 (93).
4. While this clause, the circuit court reasoned, did not expressly require licensee
to purchase anything from licensor, the effect of it would be the accomplishment of
such a result. Upon the expiration of the basic patent, licensee, in order to use the
machine efficiently, would have to purchase from licensor the privilege of using the
improvements. That licensee's necessity would have been created by the compulsion of
licensor's basic patents was thought to bring the former cases into operation here.
Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., 156 F. 2d 198, 202-203 (C.
C. A. 2d i946).
5. REv. STAT. §4898 (1875), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §47 (Supp. 1946).
6. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U. S. 386, 438 (945) at p. 452, discussing "the fundamental prob-
lem of accommodating the provisions of the patent laws to those of the anti-trust stat-
utes. Basically they are opposed in policy, the one granting rights of monopoly, the
other forbidding monopolistic activities. The patent legislation presents a special case,
the anti-trust legislation the nation's general policy.'
7. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8(8) : "To promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." See Rxv. STAT. § 4886 (875), as amended, 35
U. S. C. §31 (1940) ; REv. STArT. §4884 (1875), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §40 (1940).
See also Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. I, r9 (U. S. 1829) for an early recognition of
this purpose.
8. The consideration received by licensee for his agreement to assign improvements
was ample: had he not so agreed he would have had to pay more for the license on the
basic patent, or might have obtained, no license at all, since patent holders are not
obliged to "work" their patents. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U. S. 405 (1go8). Further, any payments he may have to make in the future
for the use of the improvements may well be considered a deferred payment for his
present license.
9. Cf. U. S. v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 8o5 (E. D. Mich. 1945).
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invention.1o But the ever-brooding anti-trust laws point the way toward
confining the privileges of the patent holder closely within the scope of his
particular patent. The pruning hook of anti-trust has disposed of patent
leases conditioned upon purchase of patent holder's products not covered
by the patent 1 and has probed into sundry prices-fixing devices.' 2 Relief
has been denied in infringement suits 13 where the Court has recognized a
tendency in the direction of anti-trust violation through the operation of
tying-in clauses in licenses.' 4  The situation in the instant case, which has
been infrequently litigated,' does not fit nicely into the verbalism of these
cases. Further, the accumulation of patents by means of other devices
such as pooling and cross-licensing 6 has been permitted where no restraint
of trade is found.'7 The Court noted that there had been no finding of
violation of the anti-trust laws in this case and that the question was still
open on remand of the cause to the circuit court. 7 a In the light of this
and of the fact that its holding was deliberately narrowed to the bare
question of the legality "per se" of the clause, the decision may well be
justified. But the inclusion of such clauses in license agreements should be
closely scrutinized for any suggestion of trade restraint and the Court's
holding confined to its narrow limits. In view of the tendency of patent
accumulations in the direction of continued monopoly,, it would seem ad-
visable to halt the progress of this tendency in its early stages,' 9 rather
than to give a blanket permission to use this device and thereafter depend
upon the cumbersome machinery 20 of the anti-trust suit to clean up a bad
situation.
io. Instant case at 615. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 20.
iI. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131 (1936);
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922).
12. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436 (1940). But compare with this, the holding
that stipulation of prices to be charged by a licensee is legal, United States v. General
Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926). For a discussion of the cases seeking to define
the "scope of the patent monopoly," see Feuer, The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-
Trust Laws, 38 COL. L. Rzv. 1145, 1157 (1938).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1942) ; Carbice Corp.
v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U. S. 27 (1931).
I5. Allbright-Nell Co. v. Stanley Hiller Co., 72 F. 2d 392 (C. C. A. 7th 1934)
(assignment clause legal; certiorari granted in instant case because of conflict between
decisions of Seventh and Second Circuits) ; American Refining Co. v. Gasoline Prod-
ucts Co., 294 S. W. 967 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (no showing that covenant in question
was part of a collateral plan to restrain trade) ; Bunker v. Stevens, 26 Fed. 245 (C. C.
D. N. J. 1885) (no need to decide legality of clause, improvements held not applicable
to product covered by basic patent).
16. Note, 45 COL. L. RExv. 6oi, 61o n. 6o (945).
17. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931) ; see testi-
mony of Dr. Vannevar Bush, 3 Hearings before Temporary National Economic Coin-
nittee, 76th Cong., ist Sess. 888 (1939).
17a. Upon remand, the circuit court affirmed the district court's original judgment
for licensor. It turned down licensee's suggestion that the case be remanded to the
district court for the taking of evidence regarding the anti-trust statutes, but confined
itself to a reading of the contract and found therein no restraint of trade. Stokes &
Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp.. i6o F. 2d - (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
18. The Court left no doubt of its appreciation of the monopolistic possibilities
latent in the accumulation of patents. Instant case at 66. See also Hamilton, Patents
and Free Enterprise, T. N. E. C. MoNoGRAPH No. 3 (1941) passim.
Ig. For a discussion of "threshold" anti-trust activities by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia whereby monopolistic practices are forestalled in prospect
by a striking-down of patent claims prior to issuance in cases showing possibilities of
use in restraint of trade, see Note, Recent Developments in the Law of Patents under
Thurman Arnold, 45 Co. L. Ray. 422 (1945).
20. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945), as-supple-
mented, 324 U. S. 570 (r945).
